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EMINENT DOMAIN ACTIONS AGAINST  
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY 
Cristina Finetti ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Government entities from time to time exercise the power of 
eminent domain to acquire property, including property owned by 
religious institutions, in order to redevelop a downtrodden 
neighborhood or further some other legitimate public purpose.  For 
example, Broward County, Florida, planned to construct a drug and 
alcohol detoxification center on a parcel of land in Fort Lauderdale, 
the site of the Christian Romany Church.1  The Church pastor leased 
the church property, but exercised an option to buy the property for 
$1.27 million after he learned about the County’s plans.2  The Bro-
ward County Circuit Court granted the County permission to force a 
$1.6 million sale of the property through the exercise of its eminent 
domain power, because the planned development of a drug and al-
cohol recovery center constituted a public use.3  The Broward County 
situation shows that churches and other religious property are not 
beyond the government’s power to take land for the public use. 
At times, religious institutions faced with condemnation chal-
lenge the action on grounds of discrimination and burdens on the 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Lehigh 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Marc Poirier for his expert guidance in 
formulating and developing this topic.  I would also like to thank Sean Mulryne for 
his diligence and patience in editing this Comment. 
 1 Brittany Wallman, Church Faces Forced Closing; Judge Has Approved Eminent Do-
main Purchase So Broward Can Build Detoxification Center on Site, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla.), July 28, 2007, at 1B. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  Counsel for the Christian Romany Church plans to appeal the decision.  Id. 
FINETTI_FINALV2 4/2/2008  6:02:38 PM 
668 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:667 
 
free exercise4 of religion.5  The institutions believe they are unfairly 
targeted with condemnation due to their non-profit status or simply 
out of animosity toward certain religious beliefs.6  For example, a 
Muslim group in Paterson, New Jersey, has been trying to build a 
mosque on a tract of land in nearby Wayne.7  For years, Wayne has 
stalled the group’s plans by claiming that the township needs to pre-
serve the land as a natural space.8  The township subsequently passed 
a resolution to acquire the tract by eminent domain.9  The Muslim 
group claims it is being treated unfairly and has sued Wayne.10
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act11 
(RLUIPA) was passed in 2000 in response to what Congress felt was 
an unwelcome change in free exercise law.12  RLUIPA, which applies 
only to land use and prison contexts, polices the imposition of sub-
stantial burdens on religious exercise by requiring such burdens to 
further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest13—this is the “strict scrutiny” test.  Although 
RLUIPA’s land use provision expressly applies only to zoning and 
landmarking laws that substantially burden religious exercise,14 many 
religious institutions facing condemnation use RLUIPA to challenge 
the attempted taking.15  In fact, Senator Edward Kennedy began ef-
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion] . . . .”). 
 5 See infra Part III.A. 
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 John Chadwick, Muslim Group: Bias Stalling Mosque Plans, THE HERALD NEWS 
(Passaic County, N.J.), July 19, 2006, at B4. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.  On November 1, 2006, Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey temporarily enjoined Wayne from condemn-
ing the property based on suspicion of the town’s motives, and also enjoined the 
Muslim group from beginning construction on the mosque at this site.  Peter J. 
Sampson, Judge Stalls Mosque Dispute: Sets Trial on Town’s Plan to Seize Tract, THE 
HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Nov. 2, 2006, at B1.  Judge Sheridan subse-
quently denied each side’s motion for summary judgment, leaving claims of inten-
tional discrimination and substantial burden on religious exercise for the fact-finder.  
Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73176, at *24–42 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 11 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 
Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§  2000cc to -5 (2000)). 
 12 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 14 Id. §§ 2000cc(a), 2000cc-5(5). 
 15 E.g., Chadwick, supra note 7, at B4.  The Muslim group alleges that Wayne vio-
lated RLUIPA, among other claims.  Id.; see also infra Part III.A. 
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forts to amend RLUIPA to explicitly include eminent domain within 
the scope of the statute.16
This Comment will argue that RLUIPA does not cover eminent 
domain actions and should not be amended to subject eminent do-
main actions against religious property to strict scrutiny review.  Part 
II traces the changes in free exercise law which led to the passage of 
RLUIPA.  Part III explains why the current version of RLUIPA does 
not cover eminent domain, through an examination of recent case 
law, the legislative history, and the fundamental conceptual distinc-
tions between eminent domain and zoning and landmarking laws.  
Part IV explains that RLUIPA should not be amended to cover emi-
nent domain because eminent domain is a generally applicable law 
ordinarily subject to rational basis review, and that religious institu-
tions seeking to challenge a condemnation have alternative legal re-
course under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment17 and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18  This 
section also demonstrates that the application of RLUIPA to eminent 
domain actions against religious property may severely limit the gov-
ernment’s power to condemn, resulting in a disproportionate impact 
on private homes and businesses.  Ultimately, this Comment will ar-
gue that RLUIPA cannot be expanded to the point that it erodes the 
vital government power of eminent domain. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Employment Division v. Smith19 served as the catalyst for a series of 
congressional efforts to heighten the protection of religious practice 
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.20  In Smith, 
two members of the Native American Church were terminated from 
their employment and denied unemployment compensation for in-
gesting peyote as part of a Church sacrament.21  Oregon law prohibits 
the possession of controlled substances, including peyote.22  The issue 
 16 E-mail from Jim Walsh, Staffer for Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senate Committee  
on the Judiciary, to author (Sept. 29, 2006, 18:38:07 EST) (on file with author). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion] . . . .”). 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 19 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000bb to -4 (2000)). 
 20 See infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
 21 494 U.S. at 874. 
 22 Id. 
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was whether the Oregon drug law burdened the Native American 
Church members’ religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause.23  The Supreme Court of the United States held that a burden 
on religion that is “merely the incidental effect of a generally appli-
cable and otherwise valid provision” does not offend the Free Exer-
cise Clause, and upheld the Oregon law.24  To explain this rule, Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, set forth an example of a 
generally applicable law—taxation.25  Justice Scalia articulated that 
taxation will impose an incidental burden on those who consider 
taxation to be sinful; however, it is not the objective of the tax law to 
burden religions.26  To grant an individual an exemption from taxa-
tion would “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every citizen to be-
come a law unto himself.”27
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that the 
Court’s holding was a dramatic shift from prior First Amendment ju-
risprudence.28  Previously, the Court applied strict scrutiny review, 
which required “the government to justify any substantial burden on 
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by 
means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”29  Justice O’Connor 
stressed that laws indirectly burdening religious activity were just as 
dangerous as laws aimed directly at religious activity and argued to 
preserve strict scrutiny review.30
 23 Id. at 874–78. 
 24 Id. at 878, 890. 
 25 Id. at 878. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 
(1879)). 
 28 Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 29 Id. at 894 (citations omitted).  The strict scrutiny standard was applied to free 
exercise challenges in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wiscon-
sin’s compulsory school attendance law, which required students to attend school 
until age sixteen, impermissibly burdened the Amish community’s religious practice 
of requiring its members to leave school at age fourteen or fifteen), and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the South Carolina Employment Security 
Commission’s denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist be-
cause of her refusal to work on the Sabbath out of the fear of false unemployment 
claims was not a compelling reason to justify the substantial burden on religious 
practice).  It is arguable that “Smith simply changed the doctrine of the free exercise 
clause to reflect the actual pattern of decisions. . . . [T]he Court had rejected all free 
exercise clause claims since 1960 except for the employment benefit cases and Yoder.”  
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1213 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 30 Smith, 494 U.S. at 897–901. 
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In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act31 (RFRA) to reinstate strict scrutiny review of substan-
tial burdens on religious conduct.32  Under RFRA, “[g]overnment 
shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability,” unless such burden passes 
strict scrutiny review.33  RFRA applied to both federal and state law.34  
However, RFRA was short-lived; in City of Boerne v. Flores,35 the Su-
preme Court found RFRA unconstitutional because it exceeded the 
scope of Congress’s power under the Enforcement Clause36 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.37  Under the Enforcement Clause, Congress 
can only exercise remedial powers congruent and proportional to the 
alleged problem sought to be corrected.38  The Court determined 
that RFRA was not remedial legislation, but a substantive change in 
constitutional law.39  The Act’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its in-
trusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting 
official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject 
matter.”40  Thus, RFRA was invalid because it permitted a tremendous 
imposition on the states’ ability to enforce general laws to promote 
citizens’ health and welfare.41  As the law stands today, RFRA is only 
valid insofar as it applies to actions of the federal government.42
 31 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2000)). 
 32 H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 4 (1999). 
 33 RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a), (b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488–89 (1993). 
 34 Id. § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489. 
 35 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000cc to -5 (2000)). 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 37 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 38 Id. at 519–20. 
 39 Id. at 532. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 534. 
 42 See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hur-
ley, 242 F.3d 950, 958, 960 (10th Cir. 2001).  Thus, the current version of RFRA su-
persedes the holding in Employment Division v. Smith, but only insofar as the substan-
tial burdens at issue result from actions by the federal government.  See CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 29, at 1217.  For example, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), the respondent church required its members to drink 
hoasca tea as a communion ritual.  Id. at 425.  This tea contained a hallucinogenic 
substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law of general 
applicability.  Id.  The Supreme Court found that the government could not prohibit 
the church’s use of the sacramental tea because it failed to put forth a compelling 
interest in support of the prohibition.  Id. at 439.  It is also important to note that sev-
eral states have enacted their own religious protection statutes—mini-RFRAs that re-
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In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act43 (RLUIPA).  Under RLUIPA: 
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regula-
tion in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the reli-
gious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or insti-
tution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest.44
RLUIPA defines “land use regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking 
law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claim-
ant’s use or development of land.”45  RLUIPA defines “government” 
as “(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity 
created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, 
agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and 
(iii) any other person acting under color of State law.”46  The scope of 
RLUIPA extends to situations where 
 (A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity 
that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability; 
 (B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial 
burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the 
several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability; or 
 (C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of 
a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under 
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, in-
dividualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property in-
volved.47
store strict scrutiny review to government-imposed burdens on religious exercise. 
Thomas C. Berg, On the Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005).  For example, the 
Illinois legislature passed its own Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the 
Boerne decision only invalidated the federal RFRA as far as it applied to the states.  St. 
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21914, at *42 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007).  A discussion of state-originating reli-
gious freedom legislation is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 43 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2000). 
 44 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 45 Id. § 2000cc-5(5). 
 46 Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 47 Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
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Thus, RLUIPA provides three constitutional bases for its power: the 
Spending Clause,48 the Commerce Clause,49 and the Enforcement 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.50
RLUIPA was designed to fill in the gaps left by Flores’s invalida-
tion of RFRA.51  It applies to state actions only,52 and it comports with 
Congress’s powers under the Enforcement Clause because it targets 
two very specific areas—land use and institutional conditions.53  Con-
gress heard extensive testimony regarding the burdens on religious 
liberty, and the evidence indicated that free exercise rights are most 
frequently burdened in the land use and institutional contexts.54  
Thus, RLUIPA was developed with a narrow focus to achieve a con-
gruent and proportional response to a serious problem.55  However, 
courts and commentators continue to debate the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA.56  For example, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s provi-
sion regarding institutionalized persons against a challenge that it 
violated the Establishment Clause57 of the First Amendment, but it 
has not yet addressed the constitutionality of the land use provisions 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes 
. . . .”). 
 50 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 51 See Corey Mertes, Note, God’s Little Acre: Religious Land Use and the Separation of 
Church and State, 74 UMKC L. REV. 221, 223–25 (2005); Mark Spykerman, Note, When 
God and Costco Battle for a City’s Soul: Can the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act Fairly Adjudicate Both Sides in Land Use Disputes?, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 291, 
298–303 (2005). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i)–(iii) (2000). 
 53 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).  RLUIPA also requires strict scrutiny review of a govern-
ment action that imposes a “substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 
residing in or confined to an institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2).  This Com-
ment will not discuss the application of RLUIPA to prisoners or other institutional-
ized persons. 
 54 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See Ariel Graff, Comment, Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Estab-
lishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Over-
stated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485, 514–17 (2005); Mertes, supra note 51, at 234–36; 
Spykerman, supra note 51, at 303–05. 
 57 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . .”). 
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as such.58  Despite its questionable constitutionality, as it stands today, 
RLUIPA supersedes the Smith rule that generally applicable laws that 
burden religious exercise do not offend the First Amendment, but 
only insofar as a state or its subdivisions impose a substantial burden 
on religious exercise within the specific contexts of zoning and 
landmarking situations and prison issues.59
The Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London60 clari-
fied the government’s power of eminent domain.  Pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,61 the govern-
ment is authorized to take private land for public use, as long as it 
pays just compensation to the owner of the private property.62  In 
Kelo, the Court interpreted “public use” as “public purpose,” rather 
than the narrower “use by the public” definition.63  The Court ac-
commodated the definition to the realities of public uses of formerly 
private land—private property was no longer condemned solely to 
construct railroads and highways, but also to establish facilities and 
residences for indirect public use and overall public benefit.64  The 
Court determined that the broad scope of “public purpose” encom-
 58 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).  In Cutter, prisoners housed by 
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction claimed prison officials im-
peded their practice of non-mainstream religions.  Id. at 712.  The prison officials 
responded that RLUIPA impermissibly advances religion because it encourages pris-
oners to adopt religious beliefs in order to receive more benefits.  Id. at 714, 721 
n.10.  The Court held that the institutionalized persons provision does not offend 
the Establishment Clause because it accommodates religious beliefs without favoring 
one belief over another or overriding legitimate concerns for prison order and 
safety.  Id. at 720–23.  However, the Court explicitly noted that it did not address the 
constitutional validity of the RLUIPA provision regarding land use regulation.  Id. at 
716 n.3. 
 59 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 1217. 
 60 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 61 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 62 Id.  The public use and just compensation requirements that accompany the 
power of eminent domain are binding on the states by incorporation of the Fifth 
Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 n.7 (1984) (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). 
 63 545 U.S. at 479–80. 
 64 See id. at 479–80 & nn. 7–8.  The Court suggested that condemnation to pro-
mote economic development was not a new concept.  See id. at 480–84 (“There is . . . 
no principled way of distinguishing economic development from other public pur-
poses that we have recognized.”).  To dispel the notion that Kelo actually broke new 
ground by permitting condemnation for economic development, Thomas Merrill 
highlights Justice Stevens’s references to takings to facilitate farming and mining, 
and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), where trade secrets were taken 
to promote competition in the pesticide market.  Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About 
Kelo, 20 A.B.A. PROB. & PROP. 19, 20 (2006). 
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passed condemnation for general economic development, thus ena-
bling the City of New London to condemn an economically de-
pressed area and develop an industrial park to revitalize the local 
economy.65  Although not explicitly stated, Justice Stevens essentially 
applied rational basis scrutiny to the city’s eminent domain proceed-
ings, evidenced by the statement, that “[f]or more than a century, 
our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and 
intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”66  
By finding economic development consistent with public use, the 
Court continued the trend of granting deference to legislatures to 
exercise the eminent domain power.67
The Becket Fund, a public interest law firm specializing in free 
exercise claims, filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the petition-
ers in Kelo.68  Although the City of New London did not condemn any 
religious property, the Becket Fund attorneys expressed concern that 
the expansion of eminent domain power would permit municipalities 
to target religious property due to their tax-exempt status.69  The 
 65 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472, 484–85. 
 66 Id. at 483.  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stressed that although there is 
a presumption that the government has taken the property for a legitimate purpose, 
accusations of favoritism toward private developers must be reviewed carefully.  Id. at 
492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  He also did not discount the application of a higher 
scrutiny to “a more narrowly drawn category of takings.”  Id. at 493.  Thomas Merrill 
suggests that the majority actually invokes a higher scrutiny than rational basis re-
view, evidenced by Justice Stevens’s statement that condemnation actions should be 
reviewed carefully to watch for the “mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual 
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”  Merrill, supra note 64, at 20–21 (citing Kelo, 
545 U.S. at 478).  In any event, the Court certainly does not invoke strict scrutiny, 
and Kelo is neither the first nor last case involving the application of a low level of 
scrutiny to review eminent domain actions.  See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229, 241–43 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); City of Guymon v. Cal 
Farley’s Boys Ranch, No. CIV-04-457-BA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38506, at *10–12 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2005). 
 67 See Kelo, U.S. 545 at 483.  Of course, the deference applied to legislatures to 
effectuate a taking for economic development was strongly challenged by the dissent 
in Kelo.  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, argued that although judicial review of a legislature’s decision to con-
demn property is narrow, taking for economic development is unconstitutional be-
cause it significantly differs from the permissible types of condemnation established 
over time (transfer of private property to public ownership, transfer of private prop-
erty to be used by the public, and condemnation to eradicate a pre-condemnation 
use of property that was harmful to society).  Id. at 497–501 (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing). 
 68 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of 
Petitioners at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 801 [hereinafter Becket Fund Brief]. 
 69 Id. at 6–7. 
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Becket Fund stated that “a judgment . . . that potential economic de-
velopment and tax revenue growth concerns justify property transfers 
from one private owner to another . . . would place religious institu-
tions at special risk of eminent domain actions.”70  The Becket Fund 
offered several examples of religious property faced with the threat of 
condemnation.71  For instance, the City of New Rochelle, New York, 
chose to condemn two churches to build an IKEA store.72
The Smith decision removed neutral laws of general applicability 
from the purview of strict scrutiny review.73  This change in free exer-
cise jurisprudence compelled Congress to pass reform measures, 
culminating in RLUIPA, which reinstates strict scrutiny review of state 
government burdens on religious activity in the land use and institu-
tional contexts.74  Similarly, the Kelo Court’s interpretation of public 
use sparked a nationwide debate over the proper use of eminent do-
main, prompting state legislatures to pass restrictions on the takings 
power.75  The Becket Fund amicus brief sheds light on the possible 
effects of Kelo on religious property, raising the question, should reli-
gious property receive heightened protection against eminent do-
main actions?  The intersection of two major legal issues—religious 
liberty and eminent domain—is the focus of this Comment. 
III. IN ITS CURRENT FORM, RLUIPA DOES NOT  
COVER EMINENT DOMAIN 
Three recent cases—Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton,76 St. 
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago,77 and City & County of 
Honolulu v. Sherman78—have held that the plain language of RLUIPA, 
defining a land use regulation as a zoning or landmarking law, does 
 70 Id. at 6. 
 71 Id. at 6–11. 
 72 Id. at 11 n.20. 
 73 See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. 
 74 See supra notes 31–46 and accompanying text. 
 75 Since the Kelo decision was handed down, thirty-four states have passed legisla-
tion designed to reform eminent domain proceedings.  INST. FOR JUSTICE CASTLE 
COALITION, LEGISLATIVE ACTION SINCE KELO 1–2 (2006).  For example, Florida re-
cently passed amendments to its eminent domain law, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.013–
73.014 (LexisNexis 2007), which requires municipalities to wait ten years prior to 
transferring from one party to another land acquired via eminent domain (to essen-
tially eliminate the incentive for private development) and forbids municipalities to 
use eminent domain to combat blight.  CASTLE COALITION, supra, at 4. 
 76 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 77 401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21914 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 78 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006). 
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not encompass eminent domain.79  In terms of legislative intent, Faith 
Temple Church also suggested that Congress did not intend RLUIPA to 
regulate the government’s power of eminent domain.80  The legisla-
tive history confirms that Congress intended to police burdens on re-
ligious property from zoning and landmarking laws only.81  Addi-
tional evidence to support this conclusion comes from the very 
nature of eminent domain itself and theories to support government 
use of the takings power.82  Only one case, Cottonwood Christian Center 
v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency,83 applied RLUIPA to an eminent do-
main action, but this ruling was consistently rejected in the most re-
cent cases on point.84
A. Recent Case Law 
1. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress  
Redevelopment Agency 
Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency involved 
the first use of RLUIPA to challenge condemnation of religious 
property.85  In an effort to expand, the Cottonwood Christian Center 
acquired several parcels of land in a section of Cypress, California, 
designated as blighted.86  When the city received a bid from Costco to 
build a store on land within the blighted area owned by Cottonwood, 
it initiated a condemnation action against Cottonwood.87  The church 
claimed that this exercise of eminent domain violated RLUIPA.88  
The court determined that the controversy centered on the applica-
tion of a land use regulation involving an individualized assessment,89 
so it applied strict scrutiny review to the condemnation action.90  In a 
note, the court rejected the city’s contention that RLUIPA does not 
 79 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 899–900; Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 
254–55; Sherman, 129 P.3d at 560–63. 
 80 See Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–56; infra notes 104–07 and ac-
companying text. 
 81 See infra Part III.B. 
 82 See infra Part III.C. 
 83 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 84 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d. at 256–57; St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d. at 
899–900; Sherman, 129 P.3d. at 563–64. 
 85 Shelly Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 
69 MO. L. REV. 653, 666 (2004). 
 86 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1209–13. 
 87 Id. at 1214–15. 
 88 Id. at 1218. 
 89 Id. at 1222. 
 90 Id. 
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apply to eminent domain.91  The court stated that condemnation 
proceedings were covered under RLUIPA’s definition of land use 
regulation because the “Redevelopment Agency’s authority to exer-
cise eminent domain to contravene blight . . . is based on a zoning 
system developed by the City [and] would unquestionably ‘limit[] or 
restrict[]’ Cottonwood’s ‘use or development of land.’”92  The court 
ultimately held that Cypress’s condemnation action imposed a sub-
stantial burden on Cottonwood, which failed strict scrutiny review.93
2. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton 
Several recent cases have rejected the Cottonwood court’s applica-
tion of RLUIPA to eminent domain actions.  In Faith Temple Church v. 
Town of Brighton, the District Court for the Western District of New 
York stated explicitly that RLUIPA does not cover eminent domain.94  
Faith Temple Church purchased a parcel of land in the Town of 
Brighton to construct a new church facility.95  The town initiated a 
condemnation proceeding against Faith Temple Church under New 
York’s eminent domain authority in order to acquire this land for de-
velopment as a town park.96  The Church sought to enjoin the town 
from using its power of eminent domain to acquire the property and 
claimed that the condemnation violated RLUIPA.97
The court addressed the town’s response that RLUIPA does not 
cover eminent domain by first examining the language of the stat-
ute.98  The court pointed out that there is no explicit mention of 
eminent domain anywhere in the statute.99  The court explained that 
RLUIPA applies to government imposition of a land use regulation, 
defined as a “‘zoning or landmarking law’ that limits the manner in 
which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant 
 91 Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 92 Cottonwnood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 n.9 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) 
(2000)). 
 93 Id. at 1226–29. 
 94 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005).  The parties settled just days before oral arguments were set to be heard in 
Faith Temple’s appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  
Marketta Gregory, Brighton Land Case Settled, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE 
(Rochester, N.Y.), Nov. 10, 2006, at 1B. 
 95 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
 96 Id. at 251–52. 
 97 Id. at 252. 
 98 Id. at 254. 
 99 Id. at 255 (“Conspicuously absent is any mention of eminent domain.  Eminent 
domain is hardly an arcane or little-known concept, and the Court will not assume 
that Congress simply overlooked it when drafting RLUIPA.”). 
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has an interest.”100  The court stated that eminent domain clearly is 
not a landmarking law, which is defined under New York law as 
“regulat[ion] and restrict[ion of] certain areas as national historic 
landmarks, special historic sites, places and buildings for the purpose 
of conservation, protection, enhancement and perpetuation of these 
places of natural heritage.”101  Then, the court determined that emi-
nent domain cannot be classified as a zoning law due to fundamental 
differences between the two types of government powers.102  Under 
New York law, towns can enact zoning laws to “regulate and restrict” 
certain aspects of property, while eminent domain involves the power 
to “take.”103
Even though the court determined that the language of RLUIPA 
on its face does not cover eminent domain, the court still conducted 
an examination of Congress’s development of RLUIPA to resolve any 
possible ambiguity.104  The court noted that the legislative history in-
dicates that Congress was concerned with the application of zoning 
laws to religious property, but the history “appears to contain no ref-
erences to eminent domain,” which suggests “eminent domain abuse 
was not perceived to be a cause for concern in drafting RLUIPA.”105  
The court suggested that Congress likely had good reason to prevent 
RLUIPA from extending to eminent domain actions, given the in-
herent differences between eminent domain and zoning: eminent 
domain takes land for public use and provides just compensation, 
whereas zoning restricts the use of private land and offers no com-
pensation.106  Thus, the court posited that there is an inherent disin-
centive to using eminent domain to acquire church property, espe-
cially from sheer bias, because the government must compensate the 
private owner and demonstrate a clearly public use for the land in 
question.107
The court addressed the Church’s contention that the condem-
nation proceeding is meant to carry out the town’s Comprehensive 
Plan, which can be likened to a zoning system because it sought to 
 100 Id. at 254 (quoting Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th 2002) (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000))). 
 101 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 
(Consol. 2007)). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(e); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (Consol. 2007)). 
 104 Id. at 255. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 255–56. 
 107 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56. 
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expand the town’s park.108  The Church was trying to apply the Cot-
tonwood court’s rationale that whenever eminent domain is based 
upon a zoning system, the condemnation falls within the scope of 
RLUIPA.109  However, the court rejected Cottonwood and found the 
connection between the eminent domain action and the town’s zon-
ing laws to be too attenuated to reach the language of RLUIPA.110
3. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago 
Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
held that an eminent domain action, unconnected to the application 
of a zoning or landmarking law, falls outside the scope of RLUIPA.111  
In St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, the city planned 
to expand O’Hare International Airport by constructing runways over 
existing cemeteries and other neighboring property.112  St. John’s 
Church, the owner of the cemetery, claimed that the city violated 
RLUIPA because relocating the cemetery would impose a substantial 
burden on the plaintiff’s religious exercise.113
The court refused to treat the Cottonwood decision as establishing 
that all eminent domain actions are subject to RLUIPA.114  Plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate that the city’s use of eminent domain was pur-
suant to or part of a zoning regulation or landmarking law, but in-
stead argued that the city’s use of eminent domain was analogous to 
zoning because condemnation placed severe restrictions on the 
Church’s use or development of the cemetery.115  The court ex-
plained that to classify a taking of property as a restriction is 
 108 Id. at 256. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 256–58.  The Cottonwood court’s treatment of the eminent domain pro-
ceeding as an application of the City’s Redevelopment Plan does not “suggest that 
any exercise of eminent domain that relates in some way to a zoning plan falls within 
the scope of RLUIPA.”  Id. at 256–57 (emphasis added). 
 111 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 
899–901 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 112 Id. at 890. 
 113 Id. at 891–92. 
 114 Id. at 899–900 & n.7 (“This Court does not find the Cottonwood court’s rea-
soning persuasive as it relates to such an attenuated relationship between eminent 
domain and zoning.”).  Thus, eminent domain alone does not fit the definition of 
land use regulation used in RLUIPA.  Id.  The court did not find that all eminent 
domain actions are beyond RLUIPA coverage, but requires some legitimate connec-
tion between a zoning or landmarking law and the condemnation.  Id. at 900 & n. 8 
(“For example, an act to acquire land (through eminent domain) and then to re-
zone it and transfer it might very well fall within the reach of RLUIPA.”). 
 115 Id. at 900. 
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an incorrect classification of the actions at issue in this case. . . . 
Land use regulations limit the use of property.  Condemnation is, 
in one sense, the ultimate limitation on the use of property.  It 
does not follow, however, that condemnation is a land use regula-
tion as this term is used in the statute.  Congress could have in-
cluded “takings” within the reach of RLUIPA but did not.116
Ultimately, the court allowed the airport expansion project to pro-
ceed.117
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the planned 
condemnation of the cemetery did not constitute a “land use regula-
tion” under RLUIPA.118  The court rejected St. John’s argument that 
the authorization to condemn the cemetery is actually an application 
of zoning law, because it changes the use of the land from a religious 
burial ground to airport property.119  The court explained that Chi-
cago’s plan could not be characterized as zoning because it did not 
“dictate to these plaintiffs what they are permitted to do with the plot 
of land[;] rather, the City seeks to assume full ownership of the land, 
after paying St. John’s full compensation.”120  The court stressed that 
eminent domain and zoning deal with land in very different ways; 
thus the planned condemnation was not regulated by RLUIPA.121  In 
addition to its conclusion that eminent domain is not equivalent to 
zoning, the Seventh Circuit also concluded that eminent domain it-
self is not captured by the term “land use regulation” under 
RLUIPA.122  As in Faith Temple Church, the court refused to rely on the 
Cottonwood dicta that eminent domain is always a land use regula-
tion.123  The court reasoned that if Congress intended to include 
eminent domain as a land use regulation, it would have said so ex-
plicitly.124
 116 Id. 
 117 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 906. 
 118 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21914, at *67–68 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 119 Id. at *69. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at *69–70 (citing Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 
2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 122 Id. at *72–74. 
 123 Id. 
 124 St. John’s, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *73 (“[B]efore federal law . . . starts 
interfering with the fundamental state power of eminent domain, it is likely that we 
would need a clear statement from Congress.”). 
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4. City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman 
In City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii also determined that RLUIPA does not apply to all eminent 
domain actions.125  The Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) 
Chapter 38126 allowed the City and County of Honolulu to file emi-
nent domain actions to acquire the land underneath condominiums 
from the fee owners to convey fee ownership to the lessees of the in-
dividual condominium units.127  The First United Methodist Church 
was a fee owner of a condominium targeted by the government for 
condemnation.128  The church challenged the action under 
RLUIPA.129
As in both Faith Temple Church and St. John’s, the court explained 
that RLUIPA applied to a “land use regulation,” clearly defined as a 
“zoning or landmarking law.”130  The court then set out the common 
legal definitions of both zoning and landmarking, and determined 
that a “‘zoning or landmarking law’ as defined by RLUIPA must per-
tain either (1) to the division of a city into districts and the regulation 
of the land usage within those districts or (2) to a monument, 
marker, or building having historical significance.”131  The court de-
termined that ROH Chapter 38, which allows the government to ac-
quire condominium property via eminent domain to carry out a 
lease-to-fee conversion, does not fit within either definition.132
B.  Legislative History 
As noted in Faith Temple Church, the legislative history behind 
RLUIPA suggests that Congress was unconcerned with condemnation 
of religious property.133  An in-depth examination of the legislative 
history, including a complete review of the congressional hearings 
 125 See 129 P.3d 542, 564 (Haw. 2006) . 
 126 HONOLULU, HAW., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 38 (1991) (repealed by REV. 
ORDINANCE 05-001 (2005)).  The court indicated that the repeal of the ordinance did 
not affect the underlying eminent domain issue.  Sherman, 129 P.3d at 545 n.1. 
 127 Sherman, 129 P.3d at 545 & n.1. 
 128 Id. at 546. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 560. 
 131 Id. at 561. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005).  The District Court for the Western District of New York did not offer a de-
tailed discussion of the legislative history of RLUIPA but did explain that Congress 
was likely unconcerned with eminent domain because congressional commentary 
centered on zoning.  See id.  This Comment will present a thorough analysis of the 
legislative history to bolster the court’s argument. 
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regarding the law and its precursor bills, strengthens the conclusion 
that Congress did not intend RLUIPA to cover eminent domain ac-
tions. 
First, it is helpful to contrast the language of precursor bills to 
the language ultimately codified in RLUIPA.  The House and Senate 
each introduced three bills, respectively, to address religious liberty 
issues post-City of Boerne.134  The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 
1999135 (RLPA 1999), H.R. 1691, the House’s second attempt at draft-
ing religious liberty protection legislation, defined “land use regula-
tion” as “a law or decision by a government that limits or restricts a 
private person’s uses or development of land, or of structures affixed 
to land.”136  In RLUIPA, a “land use regulation” is defined as “a zon-
ing or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or 
restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a struc-
ture affixed to land).”137  House Bill 1691 did not include the limita-
tion to a “zoning or landmarking law,” which suggests that RLUIPA 
was significantly narrowed to include only two specific types of restric-
tive practices.138
Next, discussion of each precursor bill during introduction and 
floor debate sheds light on congressional intent.  For example, the 
Congressional Record indicates that when RLUIPA, in its final draft ver-
sion as Senate Bill 2869, was presented to the Senate for approval, the 
bill’s land use provision was discussed solely in reference to zoning 
laws.139  For example, in a joint statement, Senators Hatch and Ken-
nedy stressed that RLUIPA was necessary because “[c]hurches . . . are 
 134 The House bills include H.R. 4862, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000); H.R. 1691, 
106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998).  The Senate 
bills include S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000); S. 2081, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2000); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998). 
 135 Religious Liberty Protection Act 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999) 
(as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 1, 1999). 
 136 Id. § 8(3).  Senate Bill 2081, the Senate’s second attempt, included the same 
definition of land use regulation, with minor grammatical variations.  S. 2081, 106th 
Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000).  Interestingly, the first attempts by both the House and Sen-
ate did not include any definition of land use regulation.  S. 2148, 105th Cong. (2nd 
Sess. 1998); H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998). 
 137 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2000).  This narrower definition of land use regula-
tion first appeared in H.R. 4862 and S. 2869, both introduced in July 2000. 
 138 See H.R. 1691; see also 146 CONG. REC. E 1563, 1563–64 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 
2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).  Rep. Canady provided a summary of each provi-
sion of RLUIPA on the day prior to the bill being signed into law by President Clin-
ton.  Id.  Canady described the definition of land use regulation as “only zoning and 
landmarking laws.”  Id. at 1564.  He also stated generally that RLUIPA was “patterned 
after” H.R. 1691, “an, earlier, more expansive bill.”  Id. at 1563 (emphasis added). 
 139 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–79 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). 
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frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also 
in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use 
regulation.”140  The senators went on to explain this claim by offering 
only examples of zoning codes.141  As a more specific example of the 
types of conduct RLUIPA sought to regulate, Senator Reid stated that 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints “maintain[ed] serious 
reservations about non-uniform zoning regulations throughout the 
country, which, though religiously-neutral on their face, have the ef-
fect of overly-restricting the size and location, among other things, of 
churches and temples.”142  This statement suggests that a major reli-
gious organization was primarily concerned with size and use restric-
tions—zoning regulations.143  Notably, the words “eminent domain” 
or “condemnation” were never mentioned during the presentation of 
the bill.144  Similarly, eminent domain is never mentioned in the 
House Committee Report regarding H.R. 1691, and discussion is fo-
cused on zoning.145
Both the Congressional Record regarding RLUIPA and the Com-
mittee Report regarding RLPA 1999 rely upon hearings before the 
House of Representatives in reaction to City of Boerne v. Flores,146 which 
provide evidence of potentially discriminatory application of land use 
regulations to religious institutions.147  The testimony provides evi-
dence of zoning practices challenged as unfairly burdensome.148  For 
example, land use attorney John Mauck presented the results of a 
survey of twenty-nine zoning codes in the Chicago area.149  Twelve of 
these zoning codes did not allow a church to locate as of right with-
out a special-use permit.150  In ten codes, churches could locate only 
 140 Id. at 7774 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 141 Id. at 7774–75 (“Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where 
they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people 
assemble for secular purposes.  Or the codes permit churches only with individual-
ized permission from the zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in dis-
criminatory ways.”). 
 142 Id. at 7778. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. at 7774–79. 
 145 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 1–42 (1999). 
 146 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 147 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy); H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18–24. 
 148 See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 100–01 (June 16, 1998) (statement 
of John Mauck, Att’y), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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in residential neighborhoods, which is generally impractical.151  This 
study involved zoning codes, particularly location restrictions, but did 
not investigate eminent domain actions.152
Similarly, Von G. Keetch, Counsel to the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints, described a potentially problematic regulation of 
religious property by the City of Forest Hills, Tennessee, in its Com-
prehensive Plan, which limited new development within the city to 
single-family homes.153  This plan set up educational and religious 
zones, but limited that designation to already existing schools and 
churches in the city, which essentially blocked the Church of Latter 
Day Saints from building a new church in Forest Hills.154  Keetch also 
relied upon a study conducted by faculty at Brigham Young Univer-
sity, which surveyed 196 cases that were categorized by the type of 
zoning issue involved.155  Keetch introduced the study as follows: 
Essentially, the zoning issues fall into two broad categories: cases 
that involve zoning on property to permit a church building to be 
erected on a particular site (“location cases”), and cases that de-
termine whether an accessory use (such as a homeless shelter or 
soup kitchen) may be allowed at the site of an existing church 
(“accessory use cases”).156
This study was directed toward zoning ordinances and their applica-
tion to religious property.157
After reviewing every available hearing, the author of this Com-
ment could locate only two references to eminent domain in the tes-
timony before Congress.158  Land use attorney Bruce Shoulson, testify-
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 26–28 (May 12, 1999) (statement of Von 
G. Keetch, Counsel, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints), microformed on CIS 
No. 00:H521-100 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 154 Id. at 27. 
 155 Id. at 22–23, 31–43. 
 156 Id. at 31. 
 157 See id. at 31–43. 
 158 See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 201 (July 14, 1998) (statement of 
Bruce D. Shoulson, Att’y, Lowenstein Sandler, PC), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-
10 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Shoulson testimony]; Protecting Religious Freedom 
After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19 (Mar. 26, 1998) (statement of Mark E. 
Chopko, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Catholic Conference), microformed on CIS No. 99:H521-
34 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Chopko testimony].  The extensive testimony 
spans nine hearings before Congress.  For a complete list of the hearings and respec-
tive testimony, see the Appendix to this Comment. 
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ing before the House Judiciary Committee on the Constitution, pre-
sented evidence of how zoning ordinances burdened Orthodox Jews 
in Northern New Jersey.159  He related one example where eminent 
domain was eventually utilized by the municipality to take land away 
from a religious institution: 
[O]ne community, in an effort to head off a zoning battle over 
the conversion to an ultra-Orthodox synagogue and relating Ye-
shiva program of buildings which had previously been used by a 
house of worship, instituted eminent domain proceedings with 
respect to the subject property on the suddenly conveniently dis-
covered grounds that specific property was needed for a new mu-
nicipal complex.160
Although the battle ultimately ended in condemnation, it was the 
culmination of a long zoning dispute.  In his discussion of substantial 
burdens on religious property, Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel of 
the United States Catholic Conference, mentioned anecdotally that 
“some of our dioceses report conflicts over the loss of land by emi-
nent domain for such things as creation of bicycle paths or parking 
lots.”161  Chopko did not relate any specific instances of litigation in-
volving religious property and eminent domain.162  This brief men-
tion of eminent domain was located amidst discussion of landmark-
ing and limitations on hours of operation and congregation size.163
Furthermore, following each session of testimony, the witnesses 
were questioned as a group by the presiding congressmen.164  There 
was no questioning following Shoulson’s testimony,165 and Chopko 
was not asked to elaborate on his mention of eminent domain; it did 
not trigger a reaction by the legislators.166  It would be unsound to 
conclude that “zoning and landmarking law” covers eminent domain 
based on two brief mentions of eminent domain in extensive testi-
mony clearly focused on zoning. 
 159 Shoulson testimony, supra note 158, at 201. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Chopko testimony, supra note 158, at 19. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 18–19. 
 164 See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 234–42 (July 14, 1998), microformed 
on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 165 See id. 
 166 Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 84–94 (Mar. 26, 
1998), microformed on CIS No. 99:H521-34 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
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C.  Fundamental Differences Between the Bases of Power of Eminent 
Domain and Zoning and Landmarking Laws 
Faith Temple Church, St. John’s, and Sherman all held that RLUIPA 
does not cover all eminent domain actions because the statute clearly 
defines “land use regulation” as a “zoning or landmarking law.”167  
The courts in these cases noted the fundamental differences between 
eminent domain and zoning or landmarking laws just by comparing 
the common definitions of the terms: eminent domain is a taking of 
land, whereas zoning and landmarking are restrictions of land use.168  
While the common definitions of these terms aptly mark the distinc-
tion, there are other theories that demonstrate that eminent domain 
and zoning and landmarking laws are fundamentally different gov-
ernment actions. 
Unlike zoning, eminent domain is not part of the state’s police 
power.169  Eminent domain and the police power are different: 
[L]aws enacted in the proper exercise of police power, which are 
reasonably necessary for the preservation of the public health, 
safety, and morals, even though they result in the impairment of 
the full use of property by the owner thereof, do not ordinarily 
constitute a “taking of private property” within the meaning of the 
constitutional provisions of federal and state governments.170
In his dissent in Kelo v. City of New London, Justice Thomas noted that 
eminent domain is not founded in the state’s police power: “The 
question whether the State can take property using the power of 
eminent domain is therefore distinct from the question whether it 
can regulate property pursuant to the police power. . . . To construe 
the Public Use Clause to overlap with the States’ police power con-
flates these two categories.”171  In the landmark case Village of Euclid v. 
 167 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 
2005); St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 
899 (N.D. Ill. 2005); City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542, 561 (Haw. 
2006). 
 168 Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–55; St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 
899–900; Sherman, 129 P.3d at 561. 
 169 See William A. McClain, Modern Concepts of Police Power and Eminent Domain, 
INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 9, 187 (Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1969).  The 
police power “describe[s] the right of government to regulate the conduct of people 
in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. at 166; see also RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 112 (1985) 
(“The sole function of the police power is to protect individual liberty and private 
property against all manifestations of force and fraud.”). 
 170 McClain, supra note 169, at 187. 
 171 545 U.S. 469, 519–20 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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Ambler Realty Co.,172 the Supreme Court stated that the zoning ordi-
nance at issue, which created use districts to separate industrial from 
residential and other commercial uses, was asserted under the police 
power.173  Zoning, in general, was a constitutional practice, as long as 
the ordinance was not “arbitrary and unreasonable, [that is] having 
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”174  When an individual purchases a parcel of land, he knows 
that he must use the land in such a way that it does not interfere with 
the rights of others, and such use is rightly policed by the state, with-
out compensation.175  However, the private property owner does not 
as readily expect the taking of his property for public use, so the gov-
ernment must compensate for the taking.176  Thus, eminent domain 
(an independent government power) and zoning (a state police 
power) are fundamentally different government actions. 
Another distinction between eminent domain and zoning is pro-
vided by cases in which the eminent domain power overrides a limita-
tion set by zoning law.  Several courts have exempted government en-
tities from compliance with zoning regulations if the entity uses its 
power of eminent domain to acquire lands for government pro-
jects.177  For example, in City of Washington v. Warren County,178 the city 
wanted to make improvements to its airport, but an amendment to 
the zoning ordinance prohibited any expansion because the airport 
property was located in a flood plain.179  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri determined that the city could pursue its plan, immune from 
the zoning ordinance.180  The court applied the “power of eminent 
domain” test: “[I]f a power has its source in the constitution, al-
though delegated by statute, then it prevails over and cannot be lim-
ited by another government entity’s power, such as zoning, that is 
 172 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 173 Id. at 387. 
 174 Id. at 395. 
 175 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (holding that a coal com-
pany, which was forbidden by state law to mine coal in such a way that would cause 
subsidence, was entitled to just compensation for the taking of its property) (“As 
long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield 
to the police power.”); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 176 See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415 (“[W]hile property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”); see also Kelo, 
545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 177 See Elaine Marie Tomko-DeLuca, Annotation, Applicability of Zoning Regulations 
to Governmental Projects or Activities, 53 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1997, updated Dec. 2005). 
 178 899 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1995). 
 179 Id. at 864. 
 180 Id. at 867. 
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delegated solely by statute and without any specific constitutional au-
thority.”181  While the power of eminent domain was set forth in the 
Missouri Constitution, the city’s zoning authority was established only 
by statute.182  In Seward County Board of Commissioners v. City of Sew-
ard,183 the Supreme Court of Nebraska also upheld the city’s creation 
of an airport on condemned property, despite a contrary zoning or-
dinance, by applying the power of eminent domain test.184  Interest-
ingly, the court noted that “[i]t has frequently been stated that the 
power of eminent domain is inherently superior to the exercise of the 
zoning power.”185  Whether based on the theory that eminent domain 
is inherently superior to zoning or that it trumps zoning power under 
certain circumstances, the notion that government projects facilitated 
by acquisition of land via condemnation need not always be subject to 
zoning regulations adds strength to the distinction between the two 
government powers.  If eminent domain can supersede zoning regu-
lations, clearly the powers are not one and the same. 
Recent case law, legislative history, and theories behind the 
power of eminent domain all support the conclusion that eminent 
domain does not fall within the scope of RLUIPA’s application.  
Commentators reaching the opposite conclusion have difficulty chal-
lenging this direct evidence.  Shelley Ross Saxer, Associate Dean of 
Academics and Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law, 
and prominent scholar in the land use context, concludes that 
RLUIPA covers eminent domain by suggesting that some courts have 
broadly interpreted the term “land use regulation.”186  She cites Vine-
yard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston,187 which 
held that the city’s refusal to amend a zoning ordinance was an act 
taken pursuant to a zoning law, creating jurisdiction under 
RLUIPA.188  She also cites Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Com-
mission,189 which treated a state land use classification system as a zon-
 181 Id. at 866 (citing City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 42 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).  Some jurisdictions apply a “balancing of the interests” test 
where the zoning power is constitutionally authorized. Id. (citing St. Louis v. City of 
Bridgeton, 705 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Mo. App. Ct. 1985)).  The test requires analysis of 
the public interests implicated in the particular land use dispute.  City of Bridgeton, 
705 S.W.2d at 529. 
 182 City of Washington, 899 S.W.2d at 867. 
 183 242 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1976). 
 184 Id. at 850–55. 
 185 Id. at 854. 
 186 Saxer, supra note 85, at 668–70. 
 187 250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 188 Saxer, supra note 85, at 669 (citing Vineyard, 250 F. Supp. at 990). 
 189 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Haw. 2002). 
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ing law.190  However, these cases do not even hint that “land use regu-
lation” can be interpreted so broadly as to include eminent domain, a 
fundamentally different type of government power.191  Saxer then ar-
gues that Cottonwood held that eminent domain is not a zoning law, 
but an application of a zoning law, which is within the scope of 
RLUIPA.192  She believes that any eminent domain action can be 
traced to a zoning system; thus, eminent domain is an application of 
the zoning law.193
However, recent case law has questioned Cottonwood’s treatment 
of eminent domain as an application of zoning.194  Another commen-
tator concedes that the legislative history of RLUIPA does not suggest 
any concern over eminent domain.195  He finds fault with the decision 
in Faith Temple Church that a connection between zoning regulations 
and eminent domain is too attenuated to bear any weight.196  But this 
decision has not been overruled or questioned in the courts.  At the 
very least, the possible, though highly attenuated, connection be-
tween eminent domain and zoning should be analyzed further by the 
courts of appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States before 
RLUIPA is interpreted to cover eminent domain. 
Faith Temple Church, St. John’s, and Sherman have not been re-
versed.  In fact, the district court ruling in St. John’s that RLUIPA does 
not cover eminent domain has been affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.  
The legislative history shows that eminent domain was not the focus 
for reform; in fact, it was only mentioned twice throughout the entire 
course of congressional discussion regarding proposed religious lib-
erty legislation.  The rules of statutory construction require a statute 
to be interpreted with regard to its common meaning, altered only if 
such a common meaning would be contradictory to congressional in-
tent.197  Interpreting RLUIPA to cover eminent domain is unsup-
ported by the language of the statute, congressional intent, and the 
 190 Saxer, supra note 85, at 669 (citing Hale O Kaula, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1070). 
 191 See id. 
 192 Id. at 670. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See supra notes 108–10, 114–16, 123 and accompanying text. 
 195 G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain 
After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1665, 1667 (2006). 
 196 Id. at 1667. 
 197 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (“Therefore, we look to 
the legislative history to determine only whether there is ‘clearly expressed legislative 
intention’ contrary to that language, which would require us to question the strong 
presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.”). 
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basic distinctions between eminent domain and zoning and land-
marking laws. 
IV. RLUIPA SHOULD NOT BE  
AMENDED TO COVER EMINENT DOMAIN 
Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the architects of RLUIPA, is 
considering an amendment to RLUIPA to include eminent domain 
actions within the statute’s purview.198  Senator Kennedy circulated a 
“Dear Colleague” letter and draft bill to fellow senators, proposing 
that eminent domain be included within the definition of land use 
regulation.199  The amendment would subject proposed condemna-
tions of religious property to strict scrutiny review.200
For the reasons discussed throughout this Part, Congress should 
reject Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment to RLUIPA, or any 
similar efforts to include eminent domain within the statute’s cover-
age.  Under current free exercise jurisprudence, a neutral, generally 
applicable state or local law outside of the land use or prison con-
texts, such as a prohibition on possession of controlled substances, 
that incidentally burdens religious exercise is only subject to rational 
basis scrutiny;201 a law requiring an individualized assessment, such as 
an ordinance directly regulating religious animal sacrifice, is subject 
to strict scrutiny.202  RLUIPA classifies all applications of zoning and 
landmarking laws as individualized assessments because religious dis-
crimination frequently underlies the particularized examination and 
evaluation of religious property.203
RLUIPA’s definition of “individualized assessment” may capture 
zoning and landmarking laws, but does not encompass eminent do-
main.  Eminent domain cannot be characterized as an individualized 
assessment because it does not involve the same scrutiny of individual 
parcels of land, and thus would not be subject to strict scrutiny re-
view.204  However, RLUIPA also applies strict scrutiny review to a land 
 198 E-mail from Jim Walsh, Staffer for Sen. Edward Kennedy, Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, to author (Sept. 29, 2006, 18:38:07 EST) (on file with author). 
 199 Marci Hamilton, Churches and Eminent Domain: A Move in Congress to Once Again 
Make Churches Privileged Landowners, Aug. 10, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
hamilton/20060810.html. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–78 (1990). 
 202 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–
43 (1993). 
 203 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 204 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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use law or government action that imposes a substantial burden on 
religion, and in turn, affects interstate commerce.205  If the language 
of RLUIPA were amended to include eminent domain as a land use 
regulation, this Commerce Clause provision could be construed to 
encompass all eminent domain actions against religious property, de-
spite being a generally applied government power.206  This automatic 
application of strict scrutiny to eminent domain is contrary to prece-
dent and would unnecessarily limit an important government 
power.207
Not only does Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment conflict 
with current law, but it also would provide an extraneous remedy, be-
cause those eminent domain actions that are truly discriminatory can 
be challenged under a regular free exercise claim or an equal protec-
tion claim.208  Furthermore, Senator Kennedy’s proposal is unwise be-
cause it could extend the unnecessary protection against condemna-
tions to auxiliary uses of religious property.209
A. Eminent Domain Is a Generally Applicable Law, Thus It Cannot 
Be Subject to Strict Scrutiny 
1. The Distinction Between Generally Applicable Laws 
and Individualized Assessments 
As discussed in Part II, making the distinction between a law re-
quiring individualized assessment and a neutral, generally applicable 
law is vital to a free exercise claim because it will determine the level 
of scrutiny a court must apply to the challenged law or government 
action.210  The Supreme Court set forth this vital distinction in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith211 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah.212  These cases established the rule that a generally ap-
plicable law is subject only to rational basis review.213  A generally ap-
 205 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 206 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 207 See infra Part IV. 
 208 See infra Part IV.B. 
 209 See infra Part IV.C. 
 210 See supra Part II. 
 211 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 212 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 213 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–90.  The Court noted that strict scrutiny review was 
applied to instances where the “State has in place a system of individual exemptions,” 
but these instances were unemployment compensation and welfare benefits cases, 
where delivery of benefits required an evaluation of the individual’s religious motiva-
tion for refusing or quitting work.  Id. at 883–85 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
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plicable law applies across the board; it does not target religious activ-
ity because of its religious nature.214  It may capture some religious ac-
tivity, but this is incidental to the primary goal of the law.215  On the 
other hand, an individualized assessment involves an evaluation of 
the religious purpose or basis for the conduct and can result in dif-
ferent treatment because of the religious purpose or basis.216  An individu-
alized assessment requires strict scrutiny review because it involves a 
direct analysis and/or regulation of religious activity, which runs a 
greater risk of offending the right to free exercise of religion.217
The facts of Smith and Lukumi illustrate the difference between a 
neutral, generally applicable law and an individualized assessment.  
In Smith, the Oregon law prohibiting use of peyote was a generally 
applicable law.218  However, in Lukumi, the challenged law was found 
to be an individualized assessment.219  In Lukumi, a Santeria church 
announced its plan to open a place of worship in Hialeah, Florida.220  
The Santeria faith conducts religious ceremonies that involve the sac-
rifice of animals.221  The City of Hialeah passed a resolution that pro-
hibited the sacrifice of animals, defined as the unnecessary killing of 
708 (1986)).  In Smith, Justice Scalia suggested that the application of a generally ap-
plicable law to religious activity could be subject to strict scrutiny review by asserting a 
hybrid rights theory.  Id. at 881–82.  When a claimant brings a challenge under the 
Free Exercise Clause “in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech and of the press,” the court must apply strict scrutiny review to 
the government action or statute.  Id. at 881.  The Court offered Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972), as an example of a hybrid rights situation.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 
881.  In Yoder, an Amish claimant asserted parental rights in addition to a free exer-
cise claim in challenging compulsory school attendance laws.  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207, 
213–14.  A hybrid rights claim was not at issue in Smith.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.  How-
ever, the courts of appeals are split as to whether or not the hybrid rights theory is 
valid.  A few circuits apply strict scrutiny when free exercise claims are brought in 
conjunction with other constitutional concerns.  See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy and 
Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 
1207–08 (9th Cir. 1996); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 
699–700 (10th Cir. 1998).  Other circuits have refused to recognize the theory.  See, 
e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the 
language [in Smith] relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court”); 
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).  Thus an 
attempt to invoke strict scrutiny review of an eminent domain proceeding against re-
ligious property by utilizing the hybrid rights theory (property interests in conjunc-
tion with a free exercise claim) would rest on shaky ground. 
 214 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–33, 542–43; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79. 
 215 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 216 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 542–43; Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. 
 217 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542–43, 547. 
 218 See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 219 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534–40. 
 220 Id. at 525–26. 
 221 Id. at 524–25. 
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an animal for ritual purposes and not primarily for consumption.222  
Although the city claimed that the resolution was designed to pro-
mote public health and prevent cruelty to animals, many other types 
of non-religious slaughter were permitted.223  Since the city passed the 
ordinance against animal slaughtering with the purpose of suppressing 
the religious practice of the Santeria church, the ordinance was not a 
neutral, generally applicable law.224  Thus, the Court determined that 
the ordinance involved an individualized assessment: 
Further, because [the ordinance] requires an evaluation of the 
particular justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a 
system of individualized governmental assessment of the reasons 
for the relevant conduct. . . . Respondent’s application of the or-
dinance’s test of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by 
judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.  
Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory 
treatment.225
RLUIPA applies when a substantial burden results from the im-
position of a land use regulation “under which a government makes, 
or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that per-
mit the government to make, individualized assessments of the pro-
posed uses for the property involved.”226  Under RLUIPA, “individual-
ized assessment” means the use of discretion by zoning officials to 
apply zoning regulations to some real property or grant deviations 
from the set regulations.227  Thus, the Act’s heightened scrutiny will 
come into play whenever a religious institution presents a property 
issue that is subject to the locality’s particularized review, even absent 
a showing that the government intended to discriminate against the 
religious landowner.228  An individualized assessment under RLUIPA, 
such as a decision whether to grant a special use permit to a church, 
may not be motivated necessarily by religious bias.229  For example, a 
 222 Id. at 526–28. 
 223 Id. at 543–44. 
 224 Id. at 540–42. 
 225 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537–38 (internal quotation omitted). 
 226 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000) (emphasis added).  Congress included the 
narrow requirement that the burden result from an individualized assessment in or-
der to legislate within the scope of its power under the Enforcement Clause.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999); Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Re-
ligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Un-
constitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 949 (2001). 
 227 See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 
1222–23 (2002); Storzer & Picarello, supra note 226, at 949–52. 
 228 Storzer & Picarello, supra note 226, at 949–51; Graff, supra note 56, at 515. 
 229 Graff, supra note 56, at 515. 
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zoning official’s decision to deny a church a zoning variance to ex-
pand its facilities may simply result from a zoning scheme designed to 
maintain the consistency of uses in a neighborhood.230  However, the 
legislative history of RLUIPA suggests that zoning and landmarking 
decisions adverse to religious property often result from underlying, 
though not overt, discrimination, especially in the context of special 
use permits and variances.231  It suggests that zoning and landmarking 
decisions based on discrimination occur frequently enough that all 
individualized assessments of property require closer scrutiny.232
Therefore, under RLUIPA, the application of a zoning or land-
marking law to a particular piece of religious property constitutes an 
individualized assessment.  Since this particularized consideration of 
religious property often results in discriminatory treatment because 
of the religious nature of the land use, the Smith rule for generally 
applicable laws does not apply, and the assessment is subject to strict 
scrutiny review.  While RLUIPA may properly classify the application 
of zoning and land use laws as individualized assessments, deserving 
of heightened protection, it cannot similarly classify eminent domain. 
2. Eminent Domain Does Not Involve the Same 
Individualized Assessment Techniques as Zoning 
Eminent domain is not an individualized assessment, but rather 
an action taken pursuant to generally applicable law.  A condemna-
tion action does not require the same consideration of the character-
istics of an individual parcel of land involved in the application of 
zoning laws.  Thus, eminent domain is not the type of action targeted 
by RLUIPA’s “individualized assessment” language. 
The government’s power to condemn is a sovereign right, lim-
ited by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment233 and the states’ 
respective constitutional provisions.234  A governmental entity takes 
private property for a public use and pays just compensation to the 
former owner.235  Typically, the entity conceives of a particular use 
and selects a location for construction.236  The government can exer-
cise its power of eminent domain to take virtually any type of prop-
 230 See id. 
 231 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774–75 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of 
Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 232 Id. 
 233 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 234 See 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.14[2] (Matthew Bender, 3d ed., 2006). 
 235 See id. 
 236 See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 
887, 890–91 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
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erty in that location, so long as the public use requirement is satis-
fied.237  For example, in St. John’s,238 the City of Chicago needed to 
expand O’Hare International Airport—a public use—and selected a 
parcel of adjoining land to construct additional runways.239  A ceme-
tery stood in the way.240  There was no evidence that the city would 
have abandoned its construction plans if a private home or business 
was located in the target area, or that the city selected the parcel with 
the specific goal of eliminating religious property.241  Certainly, in se-
lecting a location for the public use, the government entity exercising 
its eminent domain power observes the private property standing in 
its way.242  However, this is typically in furtherance of a general review 
of the overall location and the need for the new use to be constructed 
on that particular site.243
In contrast, traditional zoning serves to regulate property to 
maintain conformity with a general scheme.244  Local government 
creates a comprehensive plan, which sets out the standard for devel-
opment and empowers the entity to establish regulations and restric-
tions on aspects of property, such as the size of structures, and to di-
vide the area into use districts.245  The entity also reviews property-
holders’ requests for variances to the general scheme.246  Essentially, 
zoning sets up a master plan to ensure the co-existence of different 
land uses and to maintain at least some degree of conformity of ap-
pearance.247  Once this plan is established, it is necessary to ensure 
 237 See McClain, supra note 169, at 186. 
 238 401 F. Supp. 2d 887. 
 239 Id. at 889–91. 
 240 Id. at 890. 
 241 Id. at 898. 
 242 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473–75 (2005); St. John’s, 
401 F. Supp. 2d at 889–91. 
 243 See, e.g., 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 234, § 3.03[2][b] (citing 
Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 310(a) (1974)); THOMAS F. GESSELBRACHT ET AL., 
ILLINOIS ZONING, EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND USE MANUAL § 9-3(c)(1)–(3) (1998 & 
LexisNexis online Supp. 2005); Edward D. McKirdy et al., New Jersey Condemnation 
Practice, 2003 N.J. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. § 1.4.5. 
 244 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR URBAN 
CHANGE 57 (1971) (citing A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed. 
1926)).  The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was adopted by all fifty states and 
still remains in effect in many states.  JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 
971 (5th ed. 2002).  It serves as the basis for modern zoning ordinances.  See id. at 
971–72. 
 245 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 244, at 971–72. 
 246 MANDELKER, supra note 244, at 66–67. 
 247 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 244, at 971–72 (citing A STATE STANDARD 
ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3). 
FINETTI_FINALV2 4/2/2008  6:02:38 PM 
2008] COMMENT 697 
 
adherence to the master plan by individual property-holders.248  Ob-
viously, this can only be accomplished by carefully reviewing prob-
lematic use and proposed development of individual parcels of 
land.249
In its application of the zoning laws, the government evaluates 
how the land is used or will be used by the current property owner—
what RLUIPA deems an individualized assessment.250  This considera-
tion of the current property owner’s present use or planned change 
in use is not the government’s primary consideration when it initiates 
an action to take land via eminent domain.251  The government is 
concerned with physical location and its suitability for the post-
condemnation use of the property.252
Also, the different bases of power for eminent domain and zon-
ing, respectively, show that eminent domain does not involve the type 
of individual review involved in zoning.  Pursuant to the power of 
eminent domain, 
property . . . is taken from the owner and applied to public use 
because the use or enjoyment of such property . . . is beneficial to 
the public.  In the exercise of the police power [as in zoning] the 
owner is denied the unrestricted use or enjoyment of his prop-
erty, or his property is taken from him because his use or enjoy-
ment of such property is injurious to the public welfare.253
Eminent domain does not involve the scrutiny of individual parcels of 
land to protect against encroachments on the rights of others be-
cause it is not an exercise of the state’s police power.  Rather, emi-
nent domain serves to take property that stands in the way of a 
planned project. 
To further emphasize why eminent domain should not be con-
sidered an individualized assessment subject to strict scrutiny, emi-
nent domain in general is reviewed under rational basis scrutiny.254  
As explained in Part II in the discussion of Kelo v. City of New London, 
legislatures are accorded deference to determine what constitutes a 
public use.255  Nothing in the relevant case law suggests that a legisla-
 248 See id. at 984–85 (citing A STATE STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7). 
 249 See id. 
 250 See id. at 971–72; see also 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATH-
KOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.7 (Edward H. Zeigler, Jr., ed., Thomson 
West 2005) (1956); supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 251 See supra note 243.  
 252 See supra note 243. 
 253 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 234, § 1.42[2]. 
 254 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
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ture is further limited in selecting the type of private property to be 
condemned to effectuate the public use.256  There is certainly no 
qualification within this case law that legislatures must tip-toe around 
religious property.257  Therefore, equating eminent domain with the 
type of individualized assessment envisaged under RLUIPA exposes 
eminent domain to the highest scrutiny, which is clearly inconsistent 
with precedent.258
In addition to a land use regulation involving an individualized 
assessment, RLUIPA also applies when the government-imposed sub-
stantial burden affects a program that receives federal funding or af-
fects interstate commerce, even when this burden results from a law 
of general applicability.259  The reason is that, in addition to the En-
forcement Clause, the statute also has its basis in the Spending 
Clause260 and the Commerce Clause261 of the United States Constitu-
tion.262  Under the Commerce Clause provision, an effect on inter-
state commerce is shown when the “burden prevents a specific eco-
nomic transaction in commerce, such as a construction project, 
purchase or rental of a building, or an interstate shipment of reli-
 256 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 257 See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26. 
 258 See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229; Berman, 348 U.S. 26.  Exac-
tions are subject to more stringent review than rational basis scrutiny.  Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 937 
(2003).  An exaction is valid if two tests are met: (1) the condition is substantially re-
lated to the government’s objective, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
835–37 (1987); and (2) the nature and scope of the condition are roughly propor-
tional to the impact of the proposed development, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 388 (1994).  Commentators have suggested that a similar test should be applied 
to eminent domain actions instead of rational basis review.  Garnett, supra, at 937.  
This higher scrutiny would require the government to “demonstrate that a given ex-
ercise of eminent domain was ‘reasonably necessary’ to advance, or ‘related in nature 
and extent’ to, the public purpose for which the condemnation power was invoked.”  
Garnett, supra, at 964; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).  It is also important to note that regulatory takings are 
reviewed under different tests than eminent domain.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 259 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2000). 
 260 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
 261 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with Indian tribes 
. . . .”). 
 262 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).  This Comment will not review the Spending Clause pro-
vision because it is less applicable to the land use provisions of RLUIPA.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-219, at 14–15 (1999). 
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gious goods.”263  This provision appears to capture the application of 
zoning regulations that effectively prevent a church from expanding 
its facilities or putting purchased property to religious use.264  It has 
also been suggested that the Commerce Clause provision captures 
eminent domain actions not only because the government will rede-
velop the existing property, but because the church will also purchase 
or construct a new church building, which generates commerce.265
This Commerce Clause hook is effectively a catch-all provision 
because it applies to all substantial burdens resulting from the impo-
sition of land use regulations that affect interstate commerce, even 
burdens resulting from generally applicable laws.266  As previously dis-
cussed, eminent domain is not a land use regulation as defined under 
RLUIPA, so the Commerce Clause hook does not apply under the 
current language of RLUIPA.  However, if RLUIPA was amended to 
include eminent domain within the definition of land use regulation, 
the Commerce Clause hook would encompass eminent domain be-
cause eminent domain always involves redevelopment and construc-
tion—activities that affect interstate commerce.267  In effect, this 
would create a strangle-hold on the government’s use of its eminent 
domain power to acquire religious property.  As previously men-
tioned, eminent domain is subject to rational basis scrutiny.268  The 
legislature is accorded deference to determine whether the land is 
being taken for the public use.269  The automatic application of strict 
scrutiny review to every eminent domain action against religious 
 263 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). 
 264 See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58 (June 16, 1998) (statement of Marc 
D. Stern, Dir., Legal Dept., American Jewish Cong.), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-
10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
The Almanac also reports that religious congregations had current op-
erating expenditures of 41 billion dollars.  Some of the difference is no 
doubt savings or reserves, but much of the rest is no doubt spent on 
capital improvements—new buildings and upgrading old ones, a fact 
which makes RLPA's zoning provisions quite important.  To the extent 
that localities interfere with the ability of religious institutions to build, 
they reduce the amount of commerce in construction—much of which 
involves the interstate movement of goods (stained glass, furnishings) 
and services. 
Id. (citing VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON, NOT-FOR-PROFIT ALMANAC 1996–1997: DIMEN-
SIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR 175 (1996)). 
 265 Mathues, supra note 195, at 1663. 
 266 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2000). 
 267 See Mathues, supra note 195, at 1663. 
 268 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 269 See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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property is contrary to precedent and would severely limit an inher-
ent governmental power.270
Therefore, Senator Kennedy’s proposed amendment to include 
eminent domain within RLUIPA directly conflicts with the language 
and the purpose of the statute. Eminent domain is an action taken 
pursuant to generally applicable law.  Eminent domain is not an indi-
vidualized assessment, because the government does not apply the 
same level of scrutiny of a parcel of land that is involved in zoning or 
landmarking.  The legislative history reveals that Congress was par-
ticularly concerned with zoning issues such as special use permits and 
variances, which provide a greater opportunity for religious discrimi-
nation than does the condemnation of whole tracts of land for the 
public use.  Applying strict scrutiny review to eminent domain ac-
tions, whether authorized by the “individualized assessment” basis or 
the Commerce Clause catch-all provision, is inconsistent with current 
takings jurisprudence. 
B. Religious Institutions Do Not Need RLUIPA to Pursue Challenges 
to Allegedly Discriminatory Eminent Domain Actions 
If RLUIPA is not amended to include eminent domain, religious 
institutions suspecting that their properties are being unfairly tar-
geted would still have legal recourse.  They could bring claims under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment271 and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,272 which provide 
sufficient protection against condemnation actions based on religious 
animus. 
1. Free Exercise Claim 
A religious institution whose property is targeted by eminent 
domain can claim that the condemnation restricted its religious prac-
tice.273  Under prevailing free exercise law, a generally applicable state 
 270 See McClain, supra note 169, at 183–84 (“The power of eminent domain does 
not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution; it is inherent in 
sovereignty and exists in a sovereign government without recognition thereof in the 
constitution.”); see also Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 40, 42 (June 16, 1998) 
(statement of Marci A. Hamilton, Professor, Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law, Yeshiva Univ.), microformed on CIS No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (arguing 
that the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, another precursor to 
RLUIPA, would federalize local land use law, one of the last remaining strongholds 
of local government). 
 271 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 272 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 273 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; see supra Part III.A. 
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or local law (outside the land use or institutional contexts set forth 
under RLUIPA) that produces an incidental burden on religious 
practice is only subject to rational basis review, while a non-neutral 
law is subject to strict scrutiny.274  A non-neutral law is one that spe-
cifically targets the religious practice or property because it is reli-
gious in nature.275  While eminent domain is a generally applicable 
law, inevitably some eminent domain actions will seek to condemn 
religious property because it is religious.276  A condemnation based on 
discriminatory motive will be subject to strict scrutiny and will be 
halted by the courts if the condemnation fails to satisfy the state’s 
compelling interest, or is not narrowly tailored to meet that compel-
ling interest.277
If amended to include eminent domain, RLUIPA would subject 
all eminent domain actions that impose a substantial burden on reli-
gious practice to strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA’s Commerce 
Clause provision.278  As previously discussed, automatic strict scrutiny 
review is unwarranted in light of current free exercise jurisprudence, 
eminent domain jurisprudence, and the very nature of eminent do-
main.279  A garden-variety free exercise claim is ample protection 
against a truly discriminatory exercise of eminent domain power and 
is consistent with the law. 
2. Equal Protection Claim 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”280  The Equal Protection 
Clause protects against purely discriminatory or unjustified distinc-
tions between people and preserves fundamental rights.281
A party can challenge the government’s use of eminent domain 
against its private property as contrary to the Equal Protection Clause 
 274 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–
47 (1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990). 
 275 See supra notes 216–25 and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 277 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral 
or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. . . .  A law 
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate gov-
ernmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict 
scrutiny only in rare cases.”); see also supra Part IV.A.1. 
 278 See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra Part IV.A. 
 280 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 281 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 642. 
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on the ground that the government condemned the property in a 
discriminatory manner.282  In Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. 
Mayor & Council of Essex Fells,283 Kessler, which runs a rehabilitation 
facility for the disabled, purchased a tract of land in Essex Fells, New 
Jersey, for an additional health care and nurse training facility.284  
Kessler approached the Borough Planning Board seeking an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance, which zoned this tract for edu-
cational use.285  It had previously been owned by the Northeastern Bi-
ble College.286  When Kessler’s request was met with public disfavor, 
the Planning Board decided to condemn the property in order to 
preserve it as an open space.287  Kessler challenged the condemnation 
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for discrimination 
against disabled persons.288
The Kessler case demonstrates that a party can pursue an equal 
protection claim for a discriminatory application of eminent domain 
power.289  Thus, it follows that a religious institution which perceives 
its property is being unfairly targeted for condemnation may chal-
lenge the action as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Reli-
gious institutions that have brought RLUIPA claims have also brought 
equal protection claims.290  For example, in St. John’s,291 the plaintiff 
religious institution argued that the city discriminated against it be-
 282 See Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp. 
641 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 647–48. 
 285 Id. at 648. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 649. 
 288 Kessler, 876 F. Supp. at 648.  At this stage of the proceeding, the court denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under the state and 
federal constitutions.  Id. at 665.  Kessler also filed a motion to dismiss the borough’s 
condemnation proceeding in state court.  Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. for 
Rehab., 673 A.2d 856, 858 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).  The court dismissed the 
Borough’s condemnation complaint on the ground that it was filed in bad faith—the 
asserted public interest in using the land for a park was mere pretext for opposing 
Kessler’s presence in the community.  Id. at 861, 863.  Despite its successes, Kessler 
ultimately decided to sell the property to the borough for use as a recreational space.  
See Rachelle Garbarine, For Abandoned Campuses, Recycled Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
1996, § 9, at 1. 
 289 Kessler, 876 F. Supp. at 662–63. 
 290 See St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 
891–92 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redev. Agency, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 1203, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 291 401 F. Supp. 2d 887; see supra Part III. 
FINETTI_FINALV2 4/2/2008  6:02:38 PM 
2008] COMMENT 703 
 
cause the O’Hare Modernization Act (OMA),292 which authorized the 
city to exercise its powers to expand the airport, exempted its ceme-
tery from state religious freedom protections.293  The plaintiff claimed 
that all other religious institutions in the state were fully protected; 
thus, St. John’s cemetery was singled out for discriminatory treat-
ment.294  The court determined that the language of the OMA did 
not single out the St. John’s property, but applied to all properties 
within the planned development site.295  The Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s ruling as to St. John’s equal protection claim, em-
phasizing that there was no evidence that the OMA specifically tar-
geted religious property, especially given the fact that other religious 
cemeteries were left untouched by the condemnation plan.296
The intensity of review afforded a government action challenged 
as an equal protection violation will vary depending on the type of 
claim at issue.297  Generally, government classifications will be valid if 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, that is, if the classifica-
tions satisfy rational basis scrutiny.298  Heightened scrutiny is applied 
only to classifications against suspect classes, such as race, national 
origin, and gender, and classifications that invade fundamental 
rights.299  Freedom of religion is considered a fundamental right.300
As is often the case, a religious group will challenge an eminent 
domain action against its property using an equal protection violation 
claim based on the same ground as a free exercise or RLUIPA 
claim—the condemnation interfered with the group’s fundamental 
right to religious exercise.301  If the free exercise claim is unsuccess-
 292 O’Hare Modernization Act, 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65-15 (West 1993 & 
Supp. 2006). 
 293 St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891, 901.  The OMA amended the Illinois Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act to prevent the heightened protections afforded reli-
gious groups from interfering with Chicago’s authority to relocate cemeteries stand-
ing in the way of the proposed runway expansion project.  Id. at 891. 
 294 Id. at 901. 
 295 Id. 
 296 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21914, at *48–50 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 297 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 645. 
 298 See id. at 645–46. 
 299 See id. at 645, 649. 
 300 Id. at 762.  Other fundamental rights include family-rearing, procreation, sex-
ual activity, health care decision-making, travel, voting, access to the courts, and cer-
tain criminal procedure protections.  Id. 
 301 See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282 n.5 (1st Cir. 2005).  In Wirzburger, 
plaintiffs challenged a Massachusetts constitutional provision prohibiting public fi-
nancial support for private schools, including religiously affiliated schools.  Id. at 274.  
However, plaintiffs were prohibited from amending this constitutional provision by 
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ful—that is, there is no free exercise problem because the govern-
ment’s use of eminent domain was a neutral action, imposing only an 
incidental burden—the related equal protection claim will be re-
viewed under rational basis scrutiny.302  So, even though the govern-
ment’s interference with the fundamental right to religious exercise 
is ordinarily accorded strict scrutiny review, the interference need 
only satisfy rational basis scrutiny when it is the product of a generally 
applicable law—when it poses no free exercise violation.  Thus, when 
a court finds a challenged condemnation to be a neutral government 
action under Smith and Lukumi, the condemnation lacks the dis-
criminatory motivation that would ordinarily subject it to strict scru-
tiny under the equal protection analysis. 
In St. John’s, the equal protection claim was reviewed under ra-
tional basis scrutiny because the plaintiff’s free exercise claim failed—
the condemnation action was neutral and generally applicable.303  
The Seventh Circuit decision clarified this reasoning: “St. John’s first 
tries to repackage its free exercise argument in equal protection lan-
guage, by claiming that the [OMA restriction on Illinois religious 
freedom protections] unduly burdens its fundamental right freely to 
exercise its religion.  We have already rejected the underlying point, 
however.”304  The court determined that there was no equal protec-
tion violation for the same reason that there was no free exercise vio-
lation—Chicago did not target St. John’s property because it was reli-
gious property.305  It affirmed the lower court’s determination that 
Chicago’s plan to condemn the cemetery was rationally related to its 
interest in expanding the airport.306
public initiative because their argument was directed toward religious schools.  Id. at 
274–75.  Plaintiffs challenged this prohibition as a violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause on the ground that the state substantially burdens religious exercise when it 
creates a political process, but excludes some people from accessing that process.  Id. 
at 280.  Plaintiffs also argued that the provision restricted their fundamental right to 
free exercise, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 282. 
 302 See id. at 282–83 & n.5 (citing Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 n.3 (2004) 
(“Because we hold . . . that the program is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
. . . we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal protection claims.”).  In Wirzburger, 
plaintiffs’ free exercise claim failed because the constitutional provision prohibited 
anyone, not just a religious group, from seeking an amendment initiative.  Id. at 280.  
Thus, the court applied rational basis scrutiny to plaintiffs’ related equal protection 
claim.  Id. at 282–83. 
 303 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 282–83). 
 304 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-4418, 2007 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21914, at *62 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 305 Id. at *63–65. 
 306 Id. at *66. 
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Rational basis review in the equal protection context was dem-
onstrated in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.307  In Cle-
burne, the city required a special use permit for construction of a 
group home for mentally retarded individuals in a zone where other 
buildings, such as dormitories, apartments, and hospitals, did not re-
quire a permit.308  The city’s proffered reasons for the special use 
permit were irrational; for example, the city feared that students in a 
nearby junior high school would harass the occupants and that the 
property would be located in a 500-year flood plain.309  The Supreme 
Court determined that the special use permit requirement discrimi-
nated against the disabled because “[t]he State may not rely on a 
classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated 
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”310  Therefore, Cle-
burne’s classification of disabled persons failed rational basis scrutiny 
because it was not rationally related to achieving a legitimate gov-
ernment interest.311
In Kessler, the federal district court found that the plaintiffs made 
out a claim that the condemnation proceeding by Essex Fells was as 
irrational as the Cleburne zoning requirement.312  The Bible college 
had placed the property at issue on the market for almost two years 
prior to Kessler’s purchase.313  Essex Fells purchased a small portion 
of the tract for use as a soccer field but never acquired the remain-
der.314  Thus, the only reason to condemn the entire tract (after a two 
year lull) was the difference between uses—the Bible college versus a 
facility for disabled persons.315  The court concluded that negative at-
titudes toward the disabled, without any justifiable reason for the 
condemnation, cannot serve as a rational basis for the borough’s ex-
ercise of eminent domain over the Kessler property.316
 307 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 308 Id. at 435, 436 & n.3, 437. 
 309 Id. at 448–50. 
 310 Id. at 446.  The Court also emphasized the holding in United States Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, when it said “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group” is not a legitimate state interest on which to base a classification between 
groups of persons.  Id. at 446–47 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534 (1973)). 
 311 Id. at 448, 450. 
 312 See Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp. 
641, 663 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
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The application of rational basis scrutiny to an equal protection 
claim is sufficient protection of religious institutions’ property inter-
ests.  Rational basis scrutiny allows the government to pursue eminent 
domain actions that serve a legitimate public purpose, but still allows 
a court to halt a condemnation that targets religious property be-
cause of its religious nature.  As mentioned above, in St. John’s, the 
condemnation of the cemetery to expand the airport withstood ra-
tional basis scrutiny because it was the most effective way to create 
additional runway space;317 the city did not target the religious prop-
erty to eliminate it from Chicago.318  In contrast, a government exer-
cise of its eminent domain power in an effort to rid the community of 
the presence of a particular religious group is clearly discriminatory 
and cannot be considered a rational means of furthering a legitimate 
state interest.319
Although an equal protection claim based on the same argu-
ment as an unsuccessful free exercise claim receives rational basis 
scrutiny, “[o]ther types of equal protection claims may have inde-
pendent force, and must be considered accordingly.”320  There may 
be situations where a religious group can challenge a condemnation 
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause on a theory unrelated to 
a free exercise argument.321  A religious group may be able to bring 
an equal protection claim based on its status as a suspect class.322  
While religious affiliation alone is not suspect, if a religious group can 
demonstrate that the government treated it differently than another 
religious group, it may become a suspect class.323  For example, a Mus-
lim group may challenge an eminent domain action against its reli-
gious property by arguing that a Catholic church, similarly situated 
near the planned site of the public use, was not selected for condem-
nation.  This type of claim will likely be accorded strict scrutiny re-
view.  Discrimination among religions, especially coupled with indicia of 
 317 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 318 Id. at 898; see also St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, No. 05-
4418, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *65–66 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2007) (“Anyone or 
anything standing in the way of the O’Hare project faces the prospect of the City’s 
exercise of its eminent domain power.  We have no doubt that the legislature was 
unmoved by St. John’s religious affiliation.”). 
 319 See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 320 Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 321 Id. at 282–83 & n.5. 
 322 Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (considering 
plaintiff’s claim that conscientious objectors are a suspect class)). 
 323 St. John’s, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914, at *62–63. 
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racial or national origin bias, suggests that one type of religion is tar-
geted for unfavorable treatment. 
Thus, an equal protection claim (the condemnation interfered 
with the fundamental right to religious exercise) will only receive ra-
tional basis scrutiny if the related free exercise claim (the condemna-
tion substantially burdened religious exercise) proves unsuccessful—
if the burden or interference with religious exercise results from a 
neutral, generally applicable law or government action.  Rational ba-
sis scrutiny, as demonstrated in Cleburne, Kessler, and St. John’s, is a suf-
ficient standard of review because it will protect legitimate govern-
ment actions from overzealous judicial review, but still detect 
government actions directed toward religious groups because of their 
religious nature.  Parties that can demonstrate suspect class status 
from evidence of discrimination among religions will deservedly re-
ceive heightened protection through strict scrutiny review. 
Ultimately, eminent domain actions that are truly discriminatory 
against religious institutions will be weeded out under traditional free 
exercise and equal protection challenges.  There is no need to en-
compass eminent domain within the scope of RLUIPA because there 
is ample alternative legal recourse. 
C. Potential Negative Effects of Amending RLUIPA to  
Cover Eminent Domain 
Slippery slope, parade of horribles, snowball effect—whatever 
you choose to call it—the application of RLUIPA to condemnation of 
religious property could extend to grossly unreasonable proportions.  
As religious institutions place the “religious property” label on facili-
ties that function much like private businesses, the government will 
be substantially limited in its ability to take land for public use. 
Many religious institutions offer services in addition to worship, 
such as homeless shelters and youth groups.324  However, there is a 
current trend for many religious groups to put their properties to 
non-traditional “auxiliary uses”325 and to grow into “megachurches.”326  
 324 See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (written statement of 
Wade Henderson, Executive Dir., Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); see Reli-
gious Liberty Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 202, 204–05 (July 14, 1998) (statement of Rev. Elenora 
Giddings Ivory, Dir., D.C. Office, Presbyterian Church (USA)), microformed on CIS 
No. 00:H521-10 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 325 Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207, 
207 (2006). 
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Churches have offered a wide variety of non-religious services, includ-
ing restaurants, shopping centers, hospitals, and many other busi-
nesses.327  If these non-traditional services constitute religious exer-
cise, they would be covered by RLUIPA, because RLUIPA simply 
applies to the imposition of a substantial burden on the “religious ex-
ercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution.”328  
“Religious exercise” is defined under RLUIPA as “any exercise of re-
ligion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of reli-
gious belief” and includes the “use, building, or conversion of real 
property for the purpose of religious exercise.”329  The language of 
RLUIPA does not limit religious activity to worship within a church 
setting.330  Although the legislative history suggests the auxiliary uses 
previously mentioned should not be extended the same protection as 
traditional uses, Congress failed to make this distinction explicit 
within the language of the statute.331
It follows that if RLUIPA were amended to include eminent do-
main, religious institutions faced with a condemnation action target-
ing their properties put to auxiliary uses would be able to challenge 
the condemnation as a violation of their right to free exercise.  Hypo-
thetically, if a church utilized adjacent property to operate a religious 
book store for its congregation, and the municipality sought to con-
demn the store property for conversion into a public road, the 
church could argue that the condemnation would substantially bur-
den its ability to practice religion, which involves reading religious 
texts conveniently or exclusively available from this church store.  
This extension of the highest protection to auxiliary uses is excessive 
and would clearly infringe upon the government’s ability to take pri-
vate property for public use.  Several courts that have addressed the 
application of RLUIPA to auxiliary uses have refused to extend 
heightened protection this far.332  However, these cases involved the 
 326 Stephen A. Haller, Comment, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to 
Rein in Discriminatory State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 285, 301 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
 327 Galvan, supra note 325, at 207–08.  (“The nation's second largest church (with 
30,000 congregants) has even begun developing both a 1200-home neighborhood 
and a 280-unit gated retirement community.”). 
 328 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2000); see Galvan, supra note 325, at 208–09. 
 329 § 2000cc-5(7)(A)–(B). 
 330 Id. 
 331 Galvan, supra note 325, at 223–24 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774, 7776 
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy)). 
 332 Id. at 228–30 (citing Westchester Day Sch. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 
183, 185–190 (2d Cir. 2004); Cathedral Church of the Intercessor v. Inc. Vill. of Mal-
verne, 353 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380, 380–81, 390–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Castle Hills First 
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application of zoning ordinances to religious property.333  Given the 
hostile climate to eminent domain post-Kelo, it is not far-fetched to 
anticipate a court prohibiting a condemnation action against an aux-
iliary use. 
If RLUIPA were amended to clearly include eminent domain, 
the unnecessarily heightened protection could extend even further 
than religious institutions’ auxiliary uses.  In its amicus brief in sup-
port of the homeowners in Kelo, the Becket Fund expressed concern 
that the expansion of the public use requirement to encompass eco-
nomic development would allow municipalities to condemn religious 
property more frequently than other types of property, because reli-
gious institutions are tax exempt.334  The Becket Fund also expressed 
the same concern for “other charitable organizations” that do not 
generate tax revenue.335  It cited several examples of organizations 
faced with condemnation for replacement with stores and other 
businesses: a Moose Lodge, an American Legion hall, a homeless 
shelter, and a Goodwill thrift store.336  The application of RLUIPA to 
eminent domain, coupled with the Becket Fund’s expression of con-
cern for the vulnerability of non-religious charitable organizations, 
may encourage state legislatures to devise similar heightened protec-
tions for non-revenue or low-revenue generating establishments.  
This would severely diminish the government’s ability to exercise its 
vital takings power.  It would also leave private homes and businesses 
to face the brunt of condemnation proceedings as government enti-
ties try their best to manipulate public use plans away from religious 
and other charitable organizations.337  Worse yet, it could totally dis-
courage government entities from pursuing necessary public use pro-
jects that involve condemnation of such organizations because they 
would want to avoid expensive and lengthy litigation.338  The inclu-
Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, No. SA-01-CA-1149-RF, 2004 WL 546792, at 
*11–13 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004)). 
 333 Galvan, supra note 325, at 228–30. 
 334 Becket Fund Brief, supra note 68, at 11. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Id. 
 337 In fact, such discrepancy may raise challenges under the Establishment Clause 
and create public resentment for religious groups whom they perceive to be receiv-
ing favorable treatment.  See Graff, supra note 56, at 521–22; Hamilton, supra note 
199. 
 338 See Galvan, supra note 325, at 231 (“[L]ocal governments worry about the time, 
expense, and social cost of litigating against a well-funded or well-respected religious 
institution. . . .  [L]ocal governments have shown a tendency to acquiesce to the 
threat of a RLUIPA-based challenge rather than take on the religious institution that 
issued it.”).  Although Galvan’s discussion of municipalities’ acquiescence in the face 
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sion of eminent domain under RLUIPA would be unnecessarily ex-
pansive, tying the government’s hands and ultimately delaying or 
preventing legitimate public projects. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In its current form, RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain.  
An amendment proposed by Senator Kennedy would include emi-
nent domain within the definition of “land use regulation.”  How-
ever, this is an unnecessary and potentially detrimental enlargement 
of an already constitutionally questionable, yet powerful, law.  Emi-
nent domain is not the type of government action that Congress in-
tended to police under RLUIPA; it does not involve the same indi-
vidualized scrutiny of property as is involved in zoning and 
landmarking laws.  It is a more generally applicable, neutral power 
that is adequately policed under current law without RLUIPA.  If an 
application of eminent domain discriminates against a religious insti-
tution, it will be prevented under existing free exercise and equal 
protection law.  If amended, RLUIPA would hold every eminent do-
main action that imposed a burden on a church, synagogue, mosque, 
or temple under a microscope.  When does eminent domain not im-
pose a burden on a property-holder?  By subjecting condemnations 
of religious property to the highest scrutiny, RLUIPA would limit 
deference to the government’s decision to invoke the power of emi-
nent domain, an outcome contrary to precedent.  Given the increas-
ing size of churches and their auxiliary uses, along with the rallying 
cry for other charitable organizations to oppose takings, the govern-
ment may adopt a hands-off approach to religious property rather 
than deal with costly and troublesome litigation, with the resulting 
delay or outright abandonment of beneficial public use projects. 
It is undeniable that religious institutions play an important role 
in community life.  It is also unfortunate that many religious institu-
tions will experience harmful discriminatory treatment by govern-
ment officials applying eminent domain to essentially remove un-
popular religious believers from the neighborhood or limit their 
activities.  Both the free exercise right and the takings power are con-
tained in the Bill of Rights.  While religious liberty is one of the most 
vital rights for all Americans—indeed the cornerstone of any truly 
free society—it cannot be used to weaken the government’s power to 
take private property for the public use.  RLUIPA cannot erode the 
of RLUIPA claims focuses on zoning issues, the same result can be hypothesized in 
the condemnation context.    
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eminent domain power in order to serve the interests of the few while 
harming the interests of the public at large.  Current free exercise, 
equal protection, and takings jurisprudence is sufficient to balance 
the needs of religious institutions with the interests of the govern-
ment. 
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